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Information and communication technology (ICT) plays an important role in 
critical infrastructures (CIs). Some ICT-based services are in itself critical for the 
functioning of society while other ICT elements are essential for the functioning 
of critical processes within CIs. Moreover, many critical processes within CIs are 
monitored and controlled by industrial control systems (ICS) also referred to as 
operational technology (OT). In line with the CI-concept, the concept of critical 
information infrastructure (CII) is introduced comprising both ICT and OT. It is 
shown that CIIs extend beyond the classical set of CIs. The risk to society due to 
inadvertent and deliberate CI/CII disruptions has increased due to the interrelation, 
complexity, and dependencies of CIs and CIIs. The cyber risk due to threats to and 
vulnerabilities of ICT and OT is outlined. Methods to analyze the cyber risk to CI 
and CII are discussed at both the organization, national, and the service chain lev-
els. Cyber threats, threat actors, and the organizational, personnel, and technologi-
cal cyber security challenges are outlined. An outlook is given to near future cyber 
security risk challenges, and therefore upcoming risk, stemming from (industrial) 
internet of things and other new cyber-embedded technologies.
Keywords: critical information infrastructure, cyber, risk, critical infrastructure, 
operational technology, industrial control systems, SCADA, internet of things, 
industrial internet of things, security, mitigation
1. Introduction
This chapter ‘Analyzing the Cyber Risk in Critical Infrastructures’ discusses 
the concepts of critical infrastructure (CI) and critical information infrastructure 
(CII), highlights the need for addressing the cyber risk to CI/CII, discusses methods 
and challenges in assessing the cybersecurity risk for CI/CII, and highlights upcom-
ing cyber risk. This chapter brings together views on what comprises CII in the light 
of technological and societal developments, and how to analyze the cyber risk of 
CI and CII given the complexity of CI sector structures, dependencies, and service 
chains.
Following this introduction section, Section 2 introduces the concept of CII, its 
relation to the classical CI, and discusses the importance of analyzing the cyber risk 
to CI/CII. Section 3 discusses methods and challenges in analyzing the cyber risk to 
CI/CII both from the perspective of a single organization and across organizations 
e.g. across a CI sector or along a CI/CII service chain. Section 4 analyses the vulner-
abilities and cyber risk of operational technology (OT) in CI. Section 5 discusses 
methods to analyze the cyber security risk across multiple organizations including 
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supply chains. Section 6 provides an outlook at new technological and regulatory 
developments and their possible impact on the cybersecurity risk for CI and CII. 
This chapter concludes with the conclusions in Section 7.
2. CI, CII, and the cyber risk
2.1 What is CI and how does that relate to CII?
The Council of the European Union has defined a CI as: “an asset, system or part 
thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal 
functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the 
disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State 
as a result of the failure to maintain those functions” [1]. Currently, many states on 
the globe have defined a subset of their infrastructure services as CI using similar 
definitions for CI. Their aim is to guarantee the wellbeing of their population and 
economy by safeguarding the undisturbed functioning of the society under all 
hazards. A list of national definitions for CI can be found at [2].
To determine their set of national CI sectors, states use methodologies such as a 
national risk assessment (NRA) method [3, 4] or a risk-based approach in combina-
tion with a set of criteria [5]. CI are deemed critical at the national level if e.g. the 
number of casualties or the economic loss caused by disruptions exceed certain 
thresholds [6]. Most states recognize energy, telecommunications and internet, 
drinking water, food and health as CI sectors [7]. Within these CI sectors, states 
identified critical processes, products, and services at the national level. Depending 
on its economic structure, historic developments, cultural, and other factors, states 
may recognize other sectors as CI, e.g. social services, monuments and icons as 
shown by the webpage ‘critical infrastructure sector’ on [2].
In line with CI, CIIs comprise those ICT-based elements for which the disruption 
or destruction may – according to defined criticality criteria - have a serious impact 
on a state’s society and its economy. CII is therefore defined by [8] as “those intercon-
nected information and communication infrastructures, the disruption or destruction of 
which would have serious impact on the health, safety, security, or economic well-being 
of citizens, or on the effective functioning of government or the economy”. Nevertheless, 
many states, which have defined their CI sectors, struggle in defining and accepting 
the concept of CII although the cyber risk to society extends beyond the classical set 
of CI sectors. Section 2.2 outlines the identification of CII and highlights why CIIs 
may extend beyond the currently identified national ‘classical’ sets of CI sectors.
2.2 Identifying CIIs
Alike the protection and resilience of CI, the protection and resilience of CII 
also starts with identifying CII. Many critical and essential services of our societ-
ies largely depend on the undisturbed functioning of underlying ICT and OT. 
According to [9], OT is “the technology commonly found in cyber-physical systems that 
is used to manage physical processes and actuation through the direct sensing, monitoring 
and or control of physical devices”. The overarching term OT replaces many earlier 
notions for process control technologies to monitor and control cyber-physical 
processes (CPS): industrial control systems (ICS), distributed control systems 
(DCS), energy management systems (EMS), supervisory control and data acquisi-
tion (SCADA) systems, industrial automation and control systems (IACS), and 
process automation (PA) [10]. To mention a few applications of OT: the generation, 
transport and distribution of various modes of energy, refinery processes, building 
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automation systems (air-conditioning, elevators, fire alarm system), physical 
security access (locks, gates, cameras), laboratory analysis systems, tunnel safety 
systems, harbor cranes, and automatic guided vehicles (AGV).
Identifying the ICT- and OT-based services that are critical for a state proves to 
be complex. Most states struggle in clearly understanding and defining the informa-
tion infrastructure components of critical processes to the state and its population. 
CII elements and services are notoriously more difficult and complex to demarcate 
and define than CI, both technically, organizationally, and from a governance point 
of view.
CII elements tend to be more interwoven and tend to hide within a CI, in 
cyber-physical processes, and in stacks of information-based services. The speed 
of innovation and uptake of new digital technologies in processes that evolve into 
critical processes to the society is high. Obviously this is complex as the critical ICT- 
and OT-based functions and services hide themselves (1) in the IT-sector (telecom-
munication and internet), (2) classical sector-specific CIs (Figure 1), and (3) even 
beyond these established domains.
According to [11], CII comprise:
1. Critical elements and services of the ICT sector, for example mobile telecom-
munication data services, internet exchange points, domain name services, 
certificate infrastructures, and Global Navigation Satellite Systems such as 
Galileo, BeiDou, and GPS for Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services.
2. Critical information, communication, and operational infrastructure ele-
ments- ICT and OT- in each of the CI. This may include e.g. critical financial 
transaction systems in the financial sector, critical logistic information systems, 
and OT which monitor and control critical cyber-physical systems such as in 
gas transport, harbors, railways, healthcare, and refineries.
3. The products and services of manufacturers, vendors and system integrators 
which are used across multiple CI sectors, nationally and internationally, whose 
vulnerability or common cause failure may negatively impact the proper func-
tioning of CII and the CI that they are a critical element of.
Figure 1. 
Critical information infrastructure (source: [11]).
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4. Critical ICT- and OT-elements and services beyond the established CI domains 
mentioned under (1) to (3) above. Such elements are often operated by organi-
zations outside the classical ministerial supervision and/or regulation, may be 
physically located outside a state and or operated by foreign operators.
The extent of the nationally identified CII largely depends on the maturity and 
critical use of digital technologies by and in states (Figure 2). As a basis, essential 
CII elements include the ICT-based elements of the classical CI services such as elec-
tricity generation or drinking water. Digitally more advanced states have defined 
CIIs which have major elements outside the classical set of CIs. Due to the interna-
tional nature of CII, the governance of CII protection and resilience extends beyond 
national borders and relies on international collaboration. Due to the increased role 
of ICT and OT in almost all other CI (e.g. cloud services, smart cities, smart grids), 
defining the CII requires cyclic updates to capture the dynamics inherently linked 
to ICT- and OT-based systems and networks. This process is complex due to the 
dynamics of the dependencies, and also to the sometimes-hidden nature of these 
dependencies, think e.g. on the dependency of electricity networks on the availabil-
ity of precise timing and communication networks [12].
The EU, for instance, recognizes the need to secure both CI and CII in its 
European directive on security of network and information systems (NIS) [13]. 
The directive requires a higher level of cyber security by the operators of specific 
CI services in the energy (electricity, oil, and gas), transport (air, rail, over water, 
and road), banking, financial markets, health, drinking water supply and distribu-
tion, and digital infrastructure sectors. The non-classical CI ‘digital infrastructure’ 
comprises internet exchange points (IXs), domain name service providers (DNS), 
and top-level domain (TLD) name registries. EU Member States require by law 
that other national CI operators adhere to the same security requirements as well. 
Moreover, the NIS directive recognizes another set of CII operators: the digital ser-
vice providers (DSPs). DSPs operate online marketplaces, online search engines, 
and cloud computing services when their operations exceed a certain size.
Figure 2. 
Critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP): All activities aimed at ensuring the functionality, 
continuity, and integrity of CII to deter, mitigate and neutralize a threat, risk or vulnerability or minimize the 
impact of an incident. (source: [11]).
5
Analyzing the Cyber Risk in Critical Infrastructures
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94917
Moreover, the EU implicitly recognizes electronic identification and trust 
services for electronic transactions as CII in [14]. However, it should be noted that 
most EU states do not recognize their key registers on population, land, addresses 
and buildings, commercial companies, topology, and vehicles as CII [7].
The USA recognizes as life critical embedded systems as CII beyond the classical 
CI sectors: medical devices, internet-connected cars, and OT [15]. Other states, 
alike Australia, are in the process of identifying their CII.
The high dynamics of technological developments and subsequent societal use 
of ICT- and OT-based services, makes the identification of CII complex. What 
seems to be a new toy may become embedded in critical societal processes shortly. 
On the other hand, earlier critical services such as text messaging phase out while 
being replaced by newer mechanisms such as Whatsapp. Risk analysis and mitiga-
tion may be complex given (1) the ICT- and OT-technological dynamics, (2) the 
continuous shifts in the threat spectrum, and (3) new CII services often operated by 
new, non-traditional operators (e.g. cloud services) which do not fit automatically 
in the governance structures of states.
2.3 Why considering the cyber related risk to CI and CII?
The most feared phenomenon by states is the cascading effect due to depen-
dencies between CIs and CIIs. When one CI or CII is disrupted or destroyed, 
cascading disruption(s) may occur through the dependency of other (critical) 
infrastructure(s). Another important risk factor to CI and CII is a common cause 
failure: “a failure where the function of multiple infrastructures is disrupted or destroyed 
by the same cause or hazard affecting these infrastructures at the same location or area 
in the same time frame” [2]. Common cause failures may for instance be triggered by 
extreme weather, flooding, wildfires, and common use of the same vulnerable ICT 
or OT application, software, or equipment.
In modern societies, the (cyber) risk to society and the economy due to inadver-
tent and deliberate CI/CII disruptions and cascading and common cause phenomena 
increases due to:
• The diminishing governmental control over classical CIs and CIIs due to 
liberalization and privatization of their operations.
• A more economic-based risk approach by CI and CII operators aiming for 
improved efficiency, productivity, and organization performance, as com-
pared to a more societal risk-based approach by the earlier public CI/CII 
operators.
• The fast appearance of new ICT-based services that are perceived essential or 
even critical by society even before government considers them as being CII.
• The perceived critical use by citizens of new stacked services which make 
the underlying ICT-infrastructure critical, e.g. the mobile e-payment 
infrastructure.
• Urbanization which stresses the, often aging, CIs to the limits of their design 
capability and capacity.
• The increased dependence of CI on ICT and the hidden nature on some 
dependencies, see for instance [12] for possible cascading effects of disruptions 
of time synchronization services in electrical power networks.
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• The increased use of vulnerable ICT and OT for the monitoring and control of 
CI operations.
• Complex dependencies of CI/CII services and the risk of cascading failures.
• The increased dependence of industries and the population on undisturbed 
CI and CII services. They expect and require a high level of CI/CII resilience, 
basically an undisturbed service 24 hours per day, all year around. Modern 
societies and its population cannot cope anymore with CI/CII service disrup-
tions that affect a large area and have a long duration, citizens and businesses 
have no plan ‘B’.
• The increased level of cyber-attacks by state actors [16] and other types of 
actors [17] deliberately performing (cyber) attacks on CIs and CIIs in support 
of their political and financial objectives. See e.g. the warning in [18].
• Vulnerabilities in commonly used ICT- or OT-applications and systems being 
the source of a common cause failure, e.g. a common vulnerability in a popular 
application may lead to vulnerabilities in many organizations simultaneously, 
see e.g. the Dutch national cyber security centre (NCSC) warning for a Citrix 
vulnerability [19].
• The high dynamics in vulnerabilities of ICT- and OT-applications  
and -systems.
Therefore, the analysis and mitigation of the cyber risk in CIs and CIIs pose 
major challenges to states and their operators of essential services.
3. Assess the cyber security risk in CI
3.1 CI, CII and risk analysis
Risk analysis is defined by the EU as the “consideration of relevant threat sce-
narios, in order to assess the vulnerability and the potential impact of disruption or 
destruction of critical infrastructure”. [1] The Council of Europe’s European Centre 
of Technological Safety (TESEC) defines risk analysis as: “the determination of the 
likelihood of an event (probability) and the consequences of its occurrence (impact) for 
the purpose of comparing possible risks and making risk management decisions” [20]. 
Identifying the cyber threat scenarios and vulnerabilities related to CIs and CIIs is 
an important element of the sectoral, national, and wider CI and CII protection and 
resilience policies and frameworks [13, 5–7]. Managing the characteristics requires 
thorough and regular assessments of the cyber risk for CIs and CIIs, both at the level 
of a single CI/CII operator, across a CI/CII sector, across CI/CII chains of services, 
and at the national level.
Risk assessment (RA) is “the combination of vulnerability analysis and risk 
analysis” leading to the “determination and presentation (usually in quantitative form) 
of the potential hazards, and the likelihood and the extent of harm that may result from 
these hazards” [20].
Risk analysis, vulnerability analysis, and, subsequently, RA are therefore 
important elements of the CI/CII protection and resilience efforts. Moreover, the 
risk management (RM) process for CI and CII should not only cover the business 
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perspective of the risk but should also cover the societal impact of the risk: what 
risk does society faces when a large-scale disruption occurs? This requires RAs at 
multiple levels of aggregation, each with a different objective:
• An operator of essential services (CI or CII) will primarily use RA to obtain 
an overview of possible risk factors that can harm its business objectives and 
profits. Legal requirements will be a mere boundary condition to this process. 
The cyber risk is just one aspect which is balanced with other risk aspects such 
as e.g. technical failure, lack of key personnel due to a pandemic, and adverse 
regulation.
• A RA at the CI/CII sector level will primarily focus on the resilience and 
reputation of the whole sector considering the individual mitigation measures 
taken by the operators within the sector. E.g. what is the risk of diminished 
trust by the population in e-banking?
• A RA for a specific CI or CII service which depends on a chain of intermedi-
ate services supplied by multiple service operators. The operator of the (end) 
service will primarily focus on the resilience of the whole service chain and the 
disruption risk due to failing or disruption of one or more of the intermediate 
services. The analysis will consider the individual resilience measures taken by 
the individual operators and the residual risk for the service chain.
• A RA at the national or regional level will primarily focus on risk with 
societal impact and will take a wider range than just CI and CII. A national 
or regional RA will e.g. also consider the risk of a pandemic outbreak or a 
large-scale flooding and will balance the outcomes with the cyber risk to CIs 
and CIIs. To assess this risk, various states use a National Risk Assessment 
(NRA) method to establish a balanced national risk view including the cyber 
risk, see e.g. [3, 4, 21–23].
Due to the importance of CIs and CIIs for societies, CI and CII sectors increas-
ingly must analyze and assess their (cyber) risk regularly and systematically based 
on sector-specific regulations either imposed by the national regulator, e.g. [24], or 
through sector initiatives, e.g. the Basel III regulatory framework for the bank sec-
tor. The implementation of the EU NIS directive as discussed above requires CI and 
some of the CII operators to regularly perform RAs as a basis for their cyber security 
measures. RM is also a key element in the NIST framework [25].
Moreover, these CI and CII operators should be prepared to perform a quick 
reassessment of the cyber risk, mitigations, and the residual cyber-related risk in 
case a new cyber vulnerability or cyber threat comes to the fore.
3.2 Assessment of cyber risk by a single CI operator
The basis for the protection of CI lies in a strong RA at the operator level. 
For RA at the company level, including CI and CII operators, many methods 
and standards exist. Most of these methods are in line with the ISO 31000 series 
of RM standards [26]. For the IT-environment, ISO/IEC 27005 [27] provides 
the RM and risk mitigation background as part of the ISO/IEC 27000 series 
that assist organizations to implement information security management based 
on a set of terms and definitions [28] and security controls [29, 30]. For the 
OT-environment, security control frameworks with similar security control sets 
Issues on Risk Analysis for Critical Infrastructure Protection
8
exist, e.g. [31, 32]. Although these security control frameworks are often sector 
specific, they can be mapped on common structures or frameworks, see e.g. 
ENISA and NIST [25, 33].
One of the important factors to cover in a RA of CI/CII is the risk of ICT/
OT as a vulnerability that may cause disruptions of CI/CII. This may involve the 
risk of technical failure or human mistakes, but also the cyber risk of malicious 
attacks. Given the criticality for states, even hybrid conflicts affecting CIs and 
CIIs are envisioned, see e.g. [34, 35]. An early example is the Crimea conflict. 
On December 23, 2015, Ukrainian power companies experienced unscheduled 
power outages impacting many customers in Ukraine. In addition, there have also 
been reports of malware found in Ukrainian companies in a variety of their CI 
 sectors [36].
Section 4 below specifically focusses on the cyber risk factors related to OT.
3.3 Assessment of the cyber risk across organizations
A RA for a specific CI sector is feasible, as was shown by the EUropean Risk 
Assessment and COntingency planning Methodologies for interconnected energy 
networks (EURACOM) project [37]. This approach extended the EUropean Risk 
Assessment Methodology (EURAM) [38] with contingency planning. In particular, 
chapter 4 of the EURACOM report discusses the cyber threats to the energy CI 
sector. The methodology is based on a common and holistic approach (end-to-end 
energy supply chain) for RA, RM and contingency planning across the power, gas, 
and oil CI subsectors.
The seven steps of the EURAM RA methodology are shown in Figure 3. The 
methodology scales from the department level to the operator level, to the CI or CII 
sector, and national level. Moreover, the methodology may embed the results of 
other RA methodologies. Risk which cannot be dealt with at a certain level may be 
input to the next higher level of abstraction. For example, the risk implications of a 
pandemic or a state actor cyber-attack to a nation cannot be managed alone by a CI 
operator and must be off-loaded to and managed at the national or even suprana-
tional level.
3.4 Challenges to assess ICT/OT risk across organizations
Although methods and approaches exist to perform RA across organizations. 
(e.g. a CI/CII sector or a service chain) some practical challenges exist:
• The risk attached to ICT and OT elements across CI/CII-chains. Certain CI/CII 
services are composed of a set of (chained) ICT and OT elements provided 
and operated by multiple operators. The criticality of certain elements to a 
CI or CII may be unknown to its operator; therefore, its protection has less 
priority than required from the national CI protection (CIP) or NIS point of 
view. It is a challenge to identify such critical elements and to assess the risk 
attached across the chain. In support of this type of assessments, new meth-
ods have been proposed, e.g. the RA method suggested by the Dutch cyber 
security council which requires the collaboration of all organizations in a 
supply chain to collectively assess the risk and define the appropriate security 
controls [39].
• Identifying the risk related to critical elements in various CI/CII: Some ICT and 
OT products are widely used across many CI and CII sectors and other organi-
zations. The cyber risk attached to a systemic failure or vulnerability of such 
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a product may be large, e.g. a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows systems or 
in commonly used OT systems. Such a vulnerability may lead to a high level of 
risk at the national or even the international level. This risk is difficult to assess 
since it requires a detailed and well-maintained asset inventory of systems and 
applications used by each CI/CII operator.
• The international nature of part of the CII: Assessing the risk and taking 
mitigating measures for CIIP might be troublesome when the CII ownership, 
operations and or (operational) jurisdiction are beyond one’s national border. 
Conflict of interests, legal requirements, and procedures may occur. For 
example, a cloud server operator having its operations in state B should report 
a cyber security breach to the national authority in that state. However, state 
A may have made regulation that each CII operator should report security 
breaches within 24 hours to them. When a CI operator in state A uses such 
a cloud service, the cloud service could have been designated as CII thereby 
imposing regulation on the cloud operator in state B. Such cross-border CII 
issues arise with the diverse national implementations of the EU NIS direc-
tive [40], and other CII-related laws. The new EU security strategy intends to 
address these issues [35].
These challenges lead to the necessity to perform RM not only at the company 
level but also across the service chain, and at the sector and national levels.
4. Assessing the OT risk
4.1 OT threats and vulnerabilities
To identify the main threats and vulnerabilities for the OT environment, a 
structured approach will be used in distinguishing multiple layers. Threats to OT 
may occur at multiple layers as defined by [41]:
• The governance layer.
Figure 3. 
The EUropean Risk Assessment Methodology (EURAM) approach (source: [38]).
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• The socio-technical layer comprising the OT/ICT architecture, the technology, 
networking, and human factors.
• The operational-technical layer including (3rd party) maintenance.
According to [42], a threat to OT is the “potential cause of an unwanted incident 
through the use of one of more OT, which may result in harm to individuals, a system, 
an organization, critical infrastructure and vital societal services, the environment or the 
society at large”.
The governance layer. At the governance layer, the first threat stems from the fact 
that OT is technically embedded in functionality. The management focusses on the 
functionality, e.g. provide drinking water. Therefore, many chief information secu-
rity officers (CISOs) or equivalent executive level responsibilities largely neglect 
the cyber risk to OT which at the same time is a major risk to the functioning of the 
whole CI.
Moreover, there is major cultural difference between the IT department and 
other departments which use OT as part of the 24/7 functionality of their CI 
services. In addition, the IT department often has the cyber security mandate for 
the whole organization. “IT” develops the organization-wide cyber security poli-
cies (e.g. authentication and password policy, patch and anti-malware policies). 
Protection of the integrity, confidentiality, and privacy of information is a high 
priority. Therefore, “IT” may disrupt its operational services when required to 
install urgent patches. In their mindset, “IT” is key to the business of the whole 
organization; “OT is just the department of grease, pumps, and valves, isn’t it?”
The OT department on the other hand optimizes the control of the physical 
processes and are less concerned with cyber security. Most often, “OT” has to use 
of the networks managed by “IT” for wide area connectivity and remote access. 
“IT” even may state the company-wide cyber security policy to comply with 
specific cyber security management standards such as the ISO/IEC 27000-series 
[28]. “OT” has to adhere to those policies while such cyber security standards and 
good practices have not been developed for a 24/7 operational environment. For 
example, blocking an account after three subsequent login errors is of no help 
when an operator needs to change production settings in the middle of the night 
during an operational crisis. Such dissimilar needs, policies, and service expecta-
tions between “IT” and “OT” can be a source of conflicts. Governance of OT 
security therefore requires efforts by all involved to bridge the gap between the ICT 
and OT domains.
Another governance level threat is that the economic depreciation of OT is 
often equal to that of the OT-controlled system, e.g. a water purification unit. 
Therefore, very aged control system components such as a 486 Windows/XP 
system still operate hidden in cabinets. They still control metros, sewage systems, 
and so on.
In other situations, the renewal of OT will be a long-term process where the 
upgrade will be performed (sub)process by (sub)process. This means that the 
central system control must cooperate with both new and legacy OT. Mixed con-
figurations mean that cyber security measures cannot be activated at all or can only 
be effective on and between the new OT-systems and applications.
“No worry about cyber security of OT, the processes still can be controlled manually”. 
At least management holds that view neglecting that the same management consid-
erably reduced the experienced workforce able to manually operate the CI system. 
Therefore, an OT-disruption for longer than a couple of hours inevitably brings 
down the OT-controlled CI/CII services to society.
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The socio-technical layer. At the socio-technical layer, [42] identifies a number of 
threats to the undisturbed functioning of OT-controlled CI processes, and therefore 
to the continuity, integrity and safety of physical processes. For example:
• Lack of cyber-security awareness of operators and other people operating and 
maintaining OT-controlled processes. No specific cyber-security education and 
training is part of their curricula.
• In the process control environment, it is not unusual that employees have been 
employed for many years. The risk of sabotage activities by disgruntled and 
dismissed employees is large. Many cases can be found in the media, e.g. the 
Maroochy water breach, and a sabotaged leak detection system of the Pacific 
Oil platforms and pipelines near Huntington Beach, USA. A risk which is not 
new: insider OT sabotage occurred already in the 90’s, see e.g. [43].
The operational-technical layer. At the operational-technical layer, [42] identifies 
OT-specific threats including:
• The SCADA (and similar) protocols were designed in the 60’s with a no threat, 
benign, closed operating environment in mind. Such protocols are not robust 
against any serious cyberattack. Applying such protocols now on top of TCP/IP 
increases the risk even more. A malformed packet may crash or lead to a demen-
tia paralytica of process logic controllers as was shown by [44].
• The use of old technology and legacy OT, for reasons mentioned above, 
requires the need for personnel still knowing all ins and outs of twenty year or 
older OT as well as current technology. The old OT has no security-by-design. 
Moreover, old OT has too limited CPU and memory resources to run a malware 
protection package or encryption; the addition may break the critical process 
monitoring and control cycle. Moreover, a new plug-compatible board to 
replace a defective one may introduce new vulnerable functionality that is 
attractive to cyber attackers.
• In standard “IT” communications, temporary blocking of transmissions is 
accepted. In the OT-environment, however, not timely received status infor-
mation from a process or a delayed control command may cause irreversible 
effects in the physical environment.
• OT systems may directly or indirectly be connected via remote operations or 
maintenance with the internet. Shodan [45] and similar search engine tools 
show ample OT-equipment that are directly accessible via the internet.
• System maintenance of OT in CI requires a lot of efforts due to the sheer size 
of the number of components. Password management policies, e.g. replacing 
passwords regularly, conflicts with the 24/7 operational continuity. CI sectors 
have agreed to good practices for patching and anti-malware signature updates 
but struggle with applying them, e.g. to apply security critical patches within a 
week after publication; all other patches to be applied during the next sched-
uled maintenance slot [46, 47]. In practice, patches are applied some three-
quarter years after they became available and anti-malware signature files are 
updated after weeks if not months. “If the controlled process works, do not break 
it” is used as an excuse. Therefore, the risk of unauthorized exploitation of OT 
in CI sectors is high.
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• Third party maintenance engineers are often given unrestricted and unmoni-
tored access to key processes 24/7. Incidents have shown that third party 
employees cannot always be trusted.
4.2 Assessing the assurance of equipment and applications
A complex element in identifying the cyber risk in CII operations is assessing 
the risk in the wide variety of hardware and software CI operators use. Most CI/CII 
operators use ICT and OT from a multitude of suppliers, partly being global players. 
The hardware and software may contain hidden vulnerabilities. A CI/CII operator 
should try to ensure a high level of security of their own hardware, software, and 
services, and of those that are procured from suppliers. Organizations should adopt 
a security lifecycle approach to enhance the safe and secure functioning of their 
ICT elements. The security lifecycle comprises the acquisition, installation, system 
integration, operations, maintenance, upgrading, and decommissioning phases. 
When CI/CII operators are dependent on ICT and OT suppliers, system integrators, 
and third-party maintenance companies, they should have contractual agreements 
and measures in place to ensure that the resilience is up to par with the security 
requirements of the CI/CII organization. Based on the efforts of each organiza-
tion, the use of cyber security standards and frameworks may increase the level of 
resilience across the chain. Examples of this approach are the third-party security 
requirements included in cyber security standards and frameworks [25, 29, 30, 32].
Assessing the level of assurance of each ICT/OT element, proves to be a chal-
lenge for an individual organization. Therefore, many organizations require support 
from their government, e.g. in certification of certain equipment. Recently, the EU 
Cyber Security Act [48] provides a framework structure for certifications, which is 
being taken up by ENISA and several of the European states although a number of 
challenges is perceived [49, 50].
4.3 Assessing the risk for the OT environment
The above-mentioned characteristics of OT systems, makes it necessary to 
include the following steps as part of the RA process:
• Use a multi-disciplinary team to assess the holistic risk to cyber. The team 
shall include those involved with general IT security, OT security, physical 
security, electronic security, security of services and supplies by utilities and 
third parties (e.g. power, external telecommunications, cooling), human 
resources (e.g. personnel security and safety).
• Collaborate with government organizations and relevant computer incident 
response teams (CSIRTs) on threat information and on assessing the risk to 
OT-equipment, software, and (tele)communication means.
• Identify the ICT and OT systems and networks that are critical to the key 
operational processes of the CI operator.
• Assess the impact of a disruption of ICT and OT to the CI service(s).
• Identify the connections with outside networks.
• Identify the external dependencies including third parties.
• Identify legacy systems that may pose additional vulnerabilities.
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5. Assessing cyber security risk across CI/CII chains
Section 3.4 discussed the challenges for risk analysis across organizations in CI/CII 
chains. There exist several methods that support risk analysis across a chain of organi-
zations which provide critical or essential services. There are, however, many challenges 
in applying such methods as is shown in Section 5.2.
5.1 Methods to assess the cyber risk across chains
Due to the specific characteristics, there is a need to perform RM not only at the 
company level but also perform a collaborative assessment across CI/CII service 
chains. There have been some studies that aim to establish a method for assessing 
the cyber-security risk across chains of CI/CII operations [38, 39].
The Dutch chain analysis method [39] has been developed by a set of CI opera-
tors in the energy sector. It was their believe that organizations in a supply chain 
together are in the best position to define and deploy appropriate controls and 
initiatives to reduce any cyber security risk themselves. The method aims to provide 
insight into the cyber security risk within a supply chain. It uses a layered approach 
to provide insight into the risk that arise from the ICT/OT systems and their 
interconnections as well as the potential risk that may pose to the chain of business 
processes of organizations. The identified risk in the business processes can ulti-
mately disrupt the continuity of the entire supply chain of one or more critical or 
essential CI/CII services. By combining and merging the identified risk in business 
processes per organization, which should include their own third-party risk to these 
processes, the overall risk to the supply chain can be assessed (see Figure 4).
The aforementioned EURAM/EURACOM method uses a similar approach by 
combining three components to assess risk at an aggregated level, based on RAs  
by the individual organizations and is based on embedding lower level RA results 
by mapping the identified risk at the higher level [38].
Note that due to the hidden nature of ICT and OT within CI and CII, RM across 
the chain requires a large effort and a combination of expertise by all stakeholders 
Figure 4. 
Visualization of the Dutch supply chain risk management method (from [39]).
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to assess this risk and define appropriate mitigating measures as is highlighted by 
the aforementioned Dutch supply chain RA pilot [39]: “Providing insight into the 
cyber security risk within a supply chain requires a level of commitment of all organiza-
tions involved. It is paramount that in addition to the availability of adequate resources 
sufficient trust exists between organizations to share sensitive information among 
each other.”
5.2 Challenges to assess the cyber risk across CI/CII chains
In safeguarding CI and CII, cyber risk mitigation plays an important role. Cyber 
risk mitigation approaches comprise legal frameworks [13], the implementation of 
mostly non-CI/CII specific cyber security frameworks for ICT and OT [25, 29–32, 51], 
the sharing of cyber security information [52, 53], and a collaborative approach. The 
incentive for collaborative action to the cyber risk at the sector level and across service 
chains is clear. Resources are scarce and can be optimized by collaborating. Due to the 
interconnectedness of CI and CII, all organizations in a sector or service chain suffer 
when one weak link exists and fails, making a joint approach a necessity. Although 
many initiatives exist, the uptake of these initiatives is sometimes less than planned. 
Although there are methods available to assess the cyber risk across a CI chain, there 
exist challenges to apply those methods. Some of the factors that may prove a barrier 
in the adaptation of these methodologies are:
• Different RA methodologies used by individual organizations: Collaboration of 
RA across chains requires information sharing and discussions on the results 
of RA for the individual organizations. The sharing of information on the RA 
may be hampered when different methodologies are used. Although there are 
ways to overcome this, see e.g. [38], this requires some additional effort by the 
participating organizations.
• Scarce resources: Cyber security is a domain where expertise is still a scarce 
resource. When large scale incidents occur that would benefit from cross-
organizational collaboration, many of the personnel needed will be taken-up 
by high-priority activities within their own organizations.
• Difficulties in establishing effective public and private partnerships: collaboration 
across the chain may require a close collaboration between public and private 
organizations, e.g. on information sharing on threats and vulnerabilities. 
While public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a popular form of collaboration 
in a number of states, in practice we see that they often lead to less than satis-
factory results. Although the precise failure rate of PPPs in CIP is unknown, 
in the context of business-to-business partnerships failure rates of 30% up to 
80% have been reported. This high failure rate may be based on tensions inher-
ent to a PPP. Some balancing mechanisms are needed to overcome the inherent 
tensions [54].
• Cross-border collaboration: Most CI/CII operators use equipment of many 
different suppliers that originate worldwide. This may hamper information 
sharing and collaboration.
• Legal barriers: Anti-trust legislation on the one hand, and Freedom of 
Information (FOI) legislation on the other hand  may create barriers to  
collaborate and exchange information between organizations [53].
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• Internal barriers: Legal departments tend to block collaboration as they regard 
the shareholder risk too high due to negative image when information about 
cyber vulnerabilities or incidents leaks through partners [53].
6. What’s next?
6.1 Trends and developments in CIIP
CIIP is an ongoing challenge for governmental policymakers and political leader-
ship. Effective CIIP requires a constant assessment of future technological develop-
ments and keeping track of the dynamics in the ICT and OT domains. The increasing 
use of ICT and (embedded) OT to monitor and control critical and complex cyber-
physical systems means that most CI have CII components or are slowly transform-
ing into CII. Meanwhile, the cyber security of OT is lagging far behind that of ICT 
despite specific cyber security good practices and standards [32, 55]. However, the 
IEC 62443 framework on Security for industrial automation and control systems has 
recently been extended with a part on RA [31].
Developments in ICT and OT and their interrelationships continuously alter 
the nature of CI and CII, for instance big data, smart energy grids, autonomously 
driving vehicles, 5G, e-health monitoring, and remote robotic surgery. Keeping 
track of the dynamically changing cyber risk landscape for CI and CII is therefore 
a challenge. Chapter 6 of [56] states that the “continuous developments in digital 
technology require states to keep track of the changing risk landscape and to review 
CIIP policy accordingly”. Moreover, Chapter 4 of [11] states that “Horizon scanning 
strengthens CIIP policy as it enables nations to proactively signal and assess developments 
in technology, and to act when new technology reaches the potential to become part of the 
national CII.”
Nevertheless, it is difficult to recognize developments in the criticality of 
information infrastructures due to the hyper-connectivity of modern technologies 
which suddenly may alter existing dependencies and introduce new dependencies 
within CIIs and between CII and CI. Dependencies may shift in unforeseen ways 
due to unanticipated adoption of traditional or seemingly unimportant information 
infrastructure elements. Such changes may cause other information infrastructure 
services to become critical to a state on the one hand and to cause the criticality of 
other CII elements to disappear over time on the other hand [57].
Similarly, company policy changes unexpectedly may affect CI/CII incident 
response and recovery plans for ICT and OT operations. Consider the organization’s 
green policy to replace all vehicles by e-vehicles. The existing incident response and 
recovery plans which dispatches repair trucks and their crews over long distances 
during a long power disruption will fail when no special provisions for recharging 
during non-normal modes of operation are made and will delay the recovery of 
CIs/CIIs.
Mass adoption and integration of new technologies such as internet of things 
(IoT), industrial internet of things (IIoT), internet-of-medical-things (IOMT), 
robotics and artificial intelligence may, besides changing the nature of CI and CII, 
also increase the risk of cyber and hybrid attacks to CII [34, 35]. Ecosystems of not 
well-secured, hundreds of thousands, if not more, of internetted devices may fall 
victim of cyber criminals. Their combined power may be used to attack CI, CII and 
life-essential devices, e.g. by denial of service attacks and spreading malware [58]. 
CI/CII operators and states shall be aware of this risk in time and take precaution-
ary actions. For instance, smart grid technologies are fundamentally changing the 
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energy sector and may introduce new CII elements at the national level. With the 
advancements in sensory, actuator and wireless technologies as well as the global 
internet, the usage of OT expands rapidly towards IIoT. The need for cyber security 
by design in new technological developments such as robotics and AI most often is 
an afterthought. This increases the cyber risk to CI, CII and humans, e.g. the use of 
robotic equipment such as vehicles and as human assistants in dangerous CI envi-
ronments [59]. Moreover, new technologies enter the organization via the backdoor 
and is part of CI/CII services before the cyber risk is assessed and mitigated in a 
proper way.
6.2 Laws and regulations
The global cyber risk makes that states develop strategies, laws and regulations 
to get more grip on the cyber security risk to their state. Apart from the European 
general data protection regulation (GDPR) that became fully into effect in all 
EU Member States on May 25, 2018 [60], CI and some CII operators may be des-
ignated as operator of essential services (OES) or DSP as a result of the national 
law and related regulations which implement the EU NIS directive [13]. Whether 
one is designed as an OES or DSP depends on the service(s) provided, size of the 
operations, number of customers, area, and the level of criticality as laid down in 
national ruling. One requirement is that the OES or DSP shall notify the competent 
authority or the CSIRT with national authority without undue delay of any incident 
having a substantial impact on the provision of services. Moreover, national law 
may oblige notification by an OES to the ‘CI stovepipe’ responsible ministry or 
regulator. In case personal data is involved, the GDPR notification is required as 
well. Non-compliance with the law may result in a huge fine.
Reporting cyber incidents may lead to more transparency on the actual level of 
the cyber risk and may lead that to more awareness with operators and policymak-
ers on the risk that cyber threats and vulnerabilities pose for society.
7. Conclusions
Analyzing the cyber risk in CI and CII, firstly requires the identification of CII 
using a set of (nationally) established criteria. RA for CI and CII may take place 
at multiple levels: by the organization of the CI/CII operator, by the CI/CII sector, 
nationally across all CI/CII sectors, and along the critical and essential service sup-
ply chains. This chapter provided insight to the OT risk, identifies the need for RA 
across organizations, and describes some RA models to address the cyber risk across 
multiple organizations and for service supply chains.
In assessing the cyber risk to CI/CII at the operator level, both ICT and OT should 
be considered. There exist many CI/CII sector-specific security control standards 
which can be mapped on common structures or frameworks as has been shown by 
e.g. NIST and ENISA. Although many standards and control measures exist, the 
OT risk at the governance, socio-technical, and operational-technical layers is often 
less understood and addressed by organizations. Recent advisories by government 
agencies show that the need to address the OT risk has become more urgent since 
the number of malicious attacks on OT as well as hybrid threats are growing while 
disruptions of the OT may have a large impact on the physical CI processes.
Recent research on RA for CI emphasizes on taking CI dependencies into 
account. This proves to be even more urgent and complex for CII. RA for CIIs and 
their dependencies is complex due to the highly dynamic nature of advances in and 
use of IT and OT, the often hidden nature of technological dependencies, think e.g. 
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about PNT services, and inclusion of embedded systems. Several RA approaches 
and methods exist to assess the cyber risk across organizations. However, assessing 
the cyber risk to the CI/CII service supply chains proves to be complex as it requires 
trust and willingness of all organizations involved.
And last not but least, organizations need to consider the cyber risk of future 
technologies before such technologies creep in via the backdoor and are an essential 
part of their critical services and business operations. The introduction of these new 
technologies can be planned (e.g. in the case of smart grids), which allows for an 
upfront analysis of the security risk involved, even when this risk is not always fully 
considered. New technologies, e.g. IoTs and dependencies may also be introduced 
in a more haphazard way into traditionally well-separated environments of CI/CII 
operators. Managing this additional risk is a major challenge for the operators.
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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